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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday 12 July 1978

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 12 July 1978


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CONTENTS

25X1




USSR: Indian Ocean Arms Control Page 1

CEMA: Long-Term Economic Planning Page 2


BRIEFS Page 4

25X1

Mauritania



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USSR: Indian Ocean Arms Control

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 In what may be the opening volley of a Soviet propaganda campaign, the Soviet news agency TASS accused the US yesterday of "freezing" the Indian Ocean Arms Control talks. The TASS announcement described the "positive spirit" of the talks, which began in June 1977, but criticized the US for discontinuing them after the last session five months ago.

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25X1 [] The TASS news analyst, Aleksey Petrov, accused leading American figures, including President Carter, of making misleading statements concerning the progress of the talks. The TASS report also accused the US of expanding its military activity in the Indian Ocean and stated that construction is proceeding "full speed" at the US facility on the island of Diego Garcia. Petrov concluded that the US "freezing" of the talks is to facilitate increased military activity in the area.

25X1 [] The Soviets have been pressing the US to come back to the conference table and, during visits to several countries on the Indian Ocean littoral, Moscow's Indian Ocean talks negotiator, Lev Mendelyevich, has made it clear that it is the US that has been holding up the talks.

25X1 [] In March, the Soviets publicly rejected linking the negotiations to events in the Horn of Africa. They noted that the US might not have the "political will" to conclude the talks, but they did not assert that the talks were "frozen." At that time, there was an unusually large Soviet naval presence in the area, and the USSR was providing significant support to Ethiopia.

25X1 [] Since early June, however, the number of Soviet ships in the Horn area has returned to a normal level of 16 from the high of 32 earlier this year. Because events in the Horn are receiving less public attention and because the Soviets have normalized their naval presence, Moscow now is more likely to press the US directly in public and in private to resume the talks. []

CEMA: Long-Term Economic Planning

25X1 [] *//Government leaders of the member states of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance agreed at their annual meeting in Bucharest late last month to accelerate work on CEMA's long-term programs in energy and other key economic sectors.//*

25X1 [] *//The session ratified three long-term cooperative programs and adopted a Soviet proposal to expedite the drafting of implementing agreements, which Soviet Premier*

Kosygin said should be completed in 18 months. It will not be easy to meet Kosygin's deadline, especially for the long-term energy program. Kosygin said that the major element of the energy program is rapid expansion of nuclear powerplant construction and the specialized construction of components by the member countries.//

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[] //The Soviets have lagged in establishing sufficient productive capacity of their own, and the East Europeans may be hesitant to make the large investments the Soviets evidently expect of them. With the possible exception of the Czechoslovaks, the East Europeans would be hard put to handle the technological problems involved in producing components for nuclear powerplants.//

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[] //The energy program apparently omits CEMA-sponsored development of new oil and gas resources. It focuses instead on the need for conservation of these resources. The omission probably reflects the USSR's uncertainty over its future domestic supplies and its consequent reluctance to make long-term commitments. The East Europeans will be left to bargain bilaterally with the USSR for oil and gas to be supplied during the five-year planning period beginning in 1981.//

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[] //The participants were apparently unable to agree on what to do about the slow pace of discussions on a cooperative agreement with the EC. The Soviets want an agreement with the EC to be concluded before general bilateral trade accords are signed between the EC and individual CEMA members, and the East Europeans may be becoming impatient. Romania, which already has signed numerous specialized sectoral accords with the EC, wants to ensure that any CEMA-EC agreement does not infringe on its relationship.//

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[] //The communique reaffirmed the willingness of CEMA members to continue to develop economic relations with the West. In a rare statement for a Soviet leader, however, Kosygin acknowledged that Western economic problems are hampering the expansion of CEMA exports. []

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Mauritania:

[REDACTED] The ruling military committee that seized power in Mauritania on Monday announced yesterday the formation of a new cabinet composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. Lt. Col. Moustapha Ould Mohamed Salek, the apparent leader of the coup, heads the cabinet and is Defense Minister; some other members of the military committee are also in the cabinet. It appears that 13 of the country's 18 field-grade officers backed the coup and are members of the military committee.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The transfer of some Mauritanian units from the north to the capital to participate in the coup has left the area lightly defended and could encourage the guerrillas to step up their attacks.

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